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CITY OF MONTEREY v. DEL MONTE DUNES: DID THE
SUPREME COURT NEEDLESSLY COMPLICATE LAND USE
AND PROPERTY STANDARDS BY NOT TAKING THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP ITS HOLDING?
I. INTRODUCTION
"Property, like liberty, has been taught that some of its most
cherished immunities are not absolute, but relative."'1 Justice Car-
dozo made this comment regarding the volatility of property rights
in 1929, yet, if this comment was made today, it would still be just as
timely and poignant.2 Courts, the legislature, local planning com-
missions, and professional developers are struggling to find a bal-
ance between the rights of private property owners and the
government's ability to regulate land use for the benefit of the com-
munity and the surrounding environment.3 Urban sprawl, land use
development, and community planning are rapidly becoming some
of the nation's most prevalent environmental concerns. 4 Accord-
ingly, takings law, the legal arena charged with striking that critical
1. Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental
Ethics and Ecology Into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 347, 354 (1998)
(quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 131 (1928)).
2. See generally David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How
Perspectives On Property Rights Have Changed From Penn Central to Dolan, and What State
and Federal Courts are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REv. 523 (1999) (discussing cate-
gorical rules for takings claims, nuisance, government interests, invest-
ment-backed expectations, permit conditions and exactions). In this article,
Callies discusses how the law pertaining to property fights and land use is in a
constant state of flux:
It is, of course, possible that these rules will change. In Eastern Enterprises
v. Apfel, the U.S. Supreme Court sent a lot of mixed signals over the appli-
cation of takings jurisprudence to various interests in property. The
Court presently has before it the . . . case of Del Monte Dunes. Ostensibly
merely a conflict of circuits over matters for a jury versus matters for a
judge, the Court could easily signal (or decide) with respect to a host of
regulatory takings issues (citations omitted).
Id. at 575-76.
3. See Philip Weinberg, Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey: Will the Supreme
Court Stretch the Takings Clause Beyond the Breaking Point, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
315, 336 (1999) (discussing current development and expansion of Takings doc-
trine). Weinberg discusses the increased difficulties and complications in commu-
nity zoning and development: "The courts should strike an appropriate balance
between owners' property rights and the responsibility of the state and local gov-
ernments to control land use in order to avoid sprawl and safeguard water supply,
wetlands and historic landmarks." Id.
4. For further discussion of the current state of urban sprawl and its conse-
quences, see infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
(229)
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balance between property owners and the government, must
achieve doctrinal clarity and produce proportional growth in rela-
tion to the increasing level of importance this area of law is generat-
ing.5 In the past fifteen years, and in several of the recent Supreme
Court sessions, takings cases have occurred on a consistent basis,
demonstrating that the takings doctrine has not been adequately
developed to handle the renewed reliance upon it.6 As courts and
legislatures review current takings jurisprudence and the emerging
property challenges created by today's society, they will continue to
be presented with new questions that test the limits and scope of
the Takings doctrine. 7
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes8 involved local agencies and
landowners seeking not only direction from the Court, but also a
reconciliation with current takings precedent.9 In Del Monte Dunes,
5. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 336 (commenting on recent expansions and
applications of Takings Clause and its effectiveness).
6. See Callies, supra note 2, at 523-25 (discussing this century's development of
takings law). Callies noted in his article:
Much has been made of the terrible state of takings jurisprudence since
the U.S. Supreme Court recommenced deciding takings cases twenty-five
years ago .... It was left to the states to interpret-and generally to
erode... regulatory taking doctrine... sorting out what aspects of zoning,
subdivision and other public land use controls were legal, when, and why.
Erode they did. Regulatory takings were virtually moribund by the time
the Court re-examined the concept in the past two decades.
Id.
7. See generally Ronald L. Weaver & Nicole S. Sayfie, 1999 Update on the BertJ
Harris Private Property Rights Protection, 73 FLA. BJ. 49 (1999) (discussing potential
future expansion and restructuring of takings law). The authors suggested:
As... population grows, land use laws will be required to respond to
corresponding pressures on public facilities. Three trends will emerge.
First, local governments will be unable to address problems with origins
and cures beyond their jurisdiction, as regionalism develops to meet
unique needs in areas connected by culture, environment, and infrastruc-
ture. Second, current land use exactions and mitigation will be replaced.
Third, performance, prepayment, and prohibition standards for various
utilities will emerge. These trends will result in numerous land use reper-
cussions, including but not limited to, the continued development of
"land use courts" to balance higher land use priorities with evolving prop-
erty rights. Bike paths, environmental protection, and coastal protection
will go on, but with a restored balance of a little closer scrutiny of the
effects of such regulations on landowners compared to government
benefits....
Id. at 57-58.
8. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
9. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 315 (discussing that Del Monte Dunes could
provide Supreme Court with forum to reevaluate current state of Takings Clause);
see also Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1625 (stating property owner brought section
1983 action against city, claiming that city's repeated denials of owner's develop-
ment proposals had violated its equal protection and due process rights in addi-
tion to constituting regulatory taking).
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the Supreme Court addressed: (1) whether a Takings claim
brought under 42 U.S.C section 1983 confers a statutory right to a
jury trial; (2) if there is no existing statutory right, whether a section
1983 action is an "action at law" within the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial; and (3) whether questions of the property's
economic viability and the reasonableness of the City's develop-
ment rejections were properly submitted to ajury.10 The Supreme
Court limited its decision to the context and history of Del Monte's
development application process.11 The Supreme Court ultimately
held that a section 1983 claim that seeks legal relief is an "action at
law" under the Seventh Amendment, and that the questions
presented to the jury in this case were proper. 12
This Note reviews takings jurisprudence, specifically those is-
sues considered by the Supreme Court in Del Monte Dunes.13 Part II
chronicles the development of the Takings Clause and its applica-
tion to precedent.' 4 Part II also discusses how a takings claim is as-
serted under section 1983, as opposed to a direct constitutional
action. 15 Part III details the facts, procedural history and holding
of Del Monte Dunes.16 Part IV sets forth the analysis the Supreme
Court followed in Del Monte Dunes.17 Part V proposes that the
Supreme Court too strictly confined its section 1983 analysis to the
procedural and statutory aspects, while overlooking the resulting
judicial and policy implications. Finally, Part VI suggests that the
Supreme Court failed to create any meaningful, applicable prece-
dent because it declined to establish distinct, broad-based guide-
lines. 18 Guidelines regarding what recovery methods are available
to plaintiff landowners and under what circumstances, or specifi-
cally defining regulatory and temporary regulatory takings, which
would have provided the lower courts with standards necessary in
10. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 694 (considering whether discretion of
local municipality can be subjected tojudgment byjury).
11. See id. at 721-22.
12. See id.
13. For a full discussion of the issues that went before the Supreme Court in
this case, see infra notes 120-72 and accompanying text.
14. For a full discussion of the historical development of the Takings Clause,
see infra notes 19-83 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of section 1983 claims, see infra notes 78-83 and
accompanying text.
16. For a full discussion of the facts and procedural background of Del Monte
Dunes, see infra notes 84-120 and accompanying text.
17. For a full discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis in Del Monte Dunes,
see infra notes 120-171.
18. For a discussion of the current state of takings jurisprudence, see infra
notes 172-198 and accompanying text.
2000]
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deciding today's complex land use questions. In refusing to create
this necessary precedent, the Supreme Court has simply added to
the multitude of non-applicable takings case law.
II. BACKGROUND
The Takings Clause is derived from the Fifth Amendment re-
quirement that private property can be taken "only for public use"
with 'just compensation." 19 In turn, the Fourteenth Amendment
subjects the states to the requirements of the Fifth Amendment and
the Takings Clause.20
Although takings law is historically based on the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, takings jurisprudence has devel-
oped into two separate theories of applicability: physical occupa-
tions and regulatory takings. 21 While the Framers may not have
initially anticipated the non-physical utilization of the Takings
Clause, "with the rise of the regulatory state,. . . courts began to
recognize that the government could 'take' property without actu-
ally physically occupying it."22
The Takings Clause may be violated in two ways: (1) by direct
government land acquisition without payment ofjust compensation
to the property landowner; or (2) by government regulation of pri-
19. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in perti-
nent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
21. See Juliano v. Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management
Auth., 983 F. Supp. 319, 323 (1997) (holding that government can accomplish
taking through legislation without ever being physically present on property). The
Framers of the Fifth Amendment were most likely referring to "the formal exercise
of the power of eminent domain by government to take land for public projects"
when constructing the Takings Clause, rather than the more abstract regulatory
taking, which has developed as a second type of government action that constitu-
tionally must also be compensated for. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The Trans-
formation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy, 91 MICH. L. REv.
1315 (1992).
22. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (discussing
expansion of takings doctrine beyond physical occupations). This landmark case
first used the takings doctrine to invalidate a state statute depriving the owner of its
underground coal mining rights. See id. at 421-22. The statute was intended to
prevent the sinking of surface land as a result of coal mining, and prohibited the
owner of the subsurface rights from mining underneath any dwelling. See id. at
413-14. Justice Holmes concluded that the statute made it "commercially impracti-
cable to mine," which "has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at 414.
4
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vate property whereby the property owner is deprived use of his or
her property.23
A. Judicial Development of the Takings Clause
1. The Rise of the Regulatory Taking
Three takings cases, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,24 Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,25 and Nectow v. City of Cambridge,26 de-
cided contemporaneously in the 1920s, together established the
foundation of regulatory takings law.27 In Pennsylvania Coal, the in-
augurating case for the notion of a regulatory taking, Justice
Holmes stated that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
28
23. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992)
(holding that taking through regulation so restricts landowner that government
has occupied land in same way physical invasion would occupy land).
24. 260 U.S. 393 (1987).
25. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
26. 277 U.S. 1983 (1928).
27. See Callies, supra note 2, at 523 (discussing takings doctrine's early devel-
opment). Callies overviews how takings jurisprudence came to include zoning and
land use regulations:
In the 1920's, the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in quick succession, Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., and Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, creating regulatory takings, validating the technique
of zoning, then holding zoning can be a Fourteenth Amendment taking
as applied. After thus holding zoning facially or generally constitutional
on the one hand, but susceptible of being unconstitutionally applied on
the other, the Court then abandoned the field to the States.... It was left
to the States to interpret-and generally to erode-Holmes's regulatory
taking doctrine over the intervening half-century, sorting out what as-
pects of zoning, subdivision and other public land use controls were
legal, when, and why.
Id. at 523-24; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (decid-
ing that overregulatory government action is a taking even if there is no physical
encroachment); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (devel-
oping theory of regulatory taking); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928) (holding that certain land use stipulations rise to level of regulatory
taking).
28. Pennsylvania Coa4 260 U.S. at 415 (holding that just compensation is re-
quired by Constitution for regulatory takings as well as physical takings). But see
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Signicance For Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1258 (1996) (arguing that Framers never intended just
compensation to be applied to regulatory takings). Hart contends that land regu-
lation did exist at the time of the Fifth Amendment's inception:
Today's doctrine of regulatory takings only makes sense as a reading of
the Takings Clause if, as the Court has said, land use regulation was con-
fined to injurious uses of land when the Fifth Amendment was adopted,
with regulations of non-injurious uses coming much later. The history
presented in this Article shows, to the contrary, that regulation of non-
injurious uses of land was very common at the time of the nation's found-
ing. This prevalence implies that the Framers did not address regulation
2000]
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The Pennsylvania Coal Court mandated, for the first time, that the
government must compensate a private citizen for the taking of
that citizen's property through regulation. 29 In Euclid and Nectow,
the Court further validated its decision in Pennsylvania Coal, estab-
lishing zoning as a sound municipal mechanism, but noting that if
used improperly, zoning can rise to the level of a Fourteenth
Amendment regulatory taking. 30
Prior to the Pennsylvania Coal decision, the Court would only
recognize land use regulation as a taking under two conditions: (1)
when the regulation had an improper purpose; or (2) when a regu-
lation's implementation was not rationally related to effectuating its
intended purpose.3 1 Decades later, the Court conclusively deline-
ated the parameters of a taking through excessive regulation in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.32 Penn Central set
forth important factors in determining whether a regulation is a
taking, including: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct, investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of
the government action. 33 Justice Brennan stated, however, that
while no "set formula" exists, the test of excessiveness is whether
in the Takings Clause because they did not regard regulation as a form of
taking.
Id.
29. See Peter L. Henderer, The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
and the Logically Antecedent Question: A Practitioner's Guide to Fifth Amendment Takings
of Wetlands, 3 ENVTL. LAw. 407, 414, 433-35 (1997) (discussing Lucas and other
cases which make it easier for private landowners to claim compensable takings as
result of government regulations).
30. For further discussion of the Court's decisions in Euclid and Nectow, see
supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. See Henderer, supra note 29, at 412-14 (discussing Lucas' logically antece-
dent inquiry where Court determines scope of property owner's interest).
32. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(explaining criteria Court reviews in order to make ad hoc factual inquiry, and
how criteria is applied).
33. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (discussing factors that determine regula-
tory takings, including economic restrictions in relation to purpose of government
action); see also Henderer, supra note 29, at 416 (commenting on which govern-
ment actions rise to level of taking and which actions are not compensable because
they are insignificant occurrences). Henderer highlights the Penn Central decision
as an example of how courts have addressed the problem of what determines
whether a regulation is a taking:
[T]he Court considered the character of the government action; it held
that when the regulation can be characterized as a physical invasion of
the property, the Court will be more willing to find a taking... [T]he
Court determined whether the regulatory impact was an exercise of a
permissible generalized power-taxing and zoning for example-or an
exercise of governmental power that impacted individuals or groups. It
stated that virtually all government activity will impact property and its
6
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under an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiry," a regulation may or
may not establish a taking. 34 Nonetheless, in enumerating a spe-
cific test, Brennan ensured that a slight reduction in the value of
land resulting from regulation would not be sufficient to sustain a
takings claim.
35
2. The Ripeness Requirement
In 1985, the Court in Williamson County Regional Planning Com-
mission v. Hamilton Bank36 furthered takings jurisprudence by con-
structing a mandatory ripeness requirement for all takings
challenges against land use regulations.37 Consequently, before ad-
use in some way, but held that minor alterations in property values inci-
dental to government actions are not compensable takings.
Id.
34. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P.
Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25
B.C. ENV-rL. Arr. L. REv. 509, 517-18 (1998) (discussing that just compensation
requirement, as applied to regulatory takings, results in tying up valuable property
in agency red tape). Kendall and Lord emphasize the need for a bright-line de-
lineation of what establishes a regulatory taking:
As Justice Brennan noted, the question of what constitutes a regulatory
takings... for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment "has proved to be a
problem of considerable difficulty" and the Court "quite simply, has been
unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be com-
pensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately con-
centrated on a few persons."
Id. at 518.
35. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 325 (discussing development of takings doc-
trine and limitations to definition of regulatory taking). Weinberg noted:
The Court in Penn Central held that the city's denial of permission to
build an office tower atop New York's Grand Central Terminal, a historic
landmark, was not a taking since it left the owner with the parcel intact,
which was found to be capable of earning a reasonable return. Thus the
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations were not destroyed.
The Court went on to reject the owner's claims that its air rights had been
taken and that the landmark law was unconstitutional as spot zoning.
Id.; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (reiterating Penn
Central's test, holding that plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts which would
establish unconstitutional taking of private property).
36. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
37. See id. (holding that for land regulation decision to be judicially reviewed,
it must be final decision); see also Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 719-21 (citing Wil-
liamson in discussion of whether lower court was proper in reviewing Del Monte's
taking claim). The Del Monte Dunes Court referenced the Williamson decision in its
discussion:
In Williamson, we did review a regulatory takings case in which the plain-
tiff landowner sued a county planning commission in federal court for
money damages under [section] 1983. Whether the commission had de-
nied the plaintiff all economically viable use of the property had been
submitted to the jury. Although the Court did not consider the point, it
assumed the propriety of this procedure.
2000]
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dressing any aspect of a plaintiffs claim, a court must first deter-
mine whether the questions are ripe for federal court review.38 The
first prong of the Williamson two-prong ripeness test requires that a
"final decision" be rendered by the government entity charged with
enforcing the challenged regulation.3 9 The second prong man-
dates that the plaintiff seek compensation from the state if the state
provides a "'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for ob-
taining compensation.' "40
The critical analysis of the Williamson test turns on the particu-
lar circumstances of each case. Until a property owner has "ob-
tained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning
ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property," it is ex-
tremely difficult to accurately evaluate "[w]hether the land re-
tain [s] any reasonable beneficial use or whether [existing]
expectation interests have been destroyed."'4 1
Id. at 719 (citations omitted).
38. See Juliano v. Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management
Auth., 983 F. Supp. 319, 323 (1997) (referencing Williamson final decision in-
quiry). Injuliano, landowners filed suit seeking just compensation for damage cre-
ated by monitoring wells and piezometers remaining on their land after the
property had been tested as a possible landfill site by the government. See id. at
321-22. The State argued that the owners' regulatory taking claim was not ripe for
review and moved for summary judgement. See id. at 323. Relying on Williamson,
the court stated:
If the Court were to find Plaintiffs' regulatory takings claim-i.e., MOSA's
[Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management Authority]
designation of Plaintiffs' property as a potential site for a proposed sani-
tary landfill-ripe for judicial review, every property holder in the four-
teen preliminary siting areas could sue MOSA for the alleged diminution
in property value resulting from the possibility that the property might
ultimately be acquired by MOSA for use as a landfill. This is far too specu-
lative. In addition to the important policy implications of opening the
courthouse doors to this flood of potential litigants, certain practical con-
cerns also caution against a finding of ripeness. Without such a final deci-
sion, a court cannot determine adequately the economic loss-a central
factor in the inquiry-occasioned by the application of the regulatory re-
strictions. Unless a final decision has been rendered, it remains unclearjust how far the regulation goes. (internal citations omitted)
Id. at 324.
39. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 185-86 (noting that final decision means no
possibility that revised plan would be approved).
40. Id. at 194 (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
124-25 (1974))(noting requirement that before plaintiff can seek federal relief, he
or she must first pursue state compensation mechanisms).
41. Id. at 190 (emphasizing that final decision determination is dependent
upon specific facts of each case). The Williamson Court also struggled with drawing
a clear line as to what constitutes a regulatory taking and what does not:
[T]he difficult problem [is] how to define "too far," that is, how to distin-
guish the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the
same effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain
or physical possession .... [R] esolution of that question depends, in sig-
[Vol. XI: p. 229
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol11/iss1/7
DEZ MONTE DUNES
The following term in 1986, the Supreme Court reiterated its
Williamson decision in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of
Yolo.42 In MacDonald, the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding in which the lower court sustained a demurrer to a
complaint due to appellant's insufficient factual allegations. 43 The
Ninth Circuit's holding was based on the fact that because only one
development proposal had been submitted, the record could not
definitively establish that the property at issue had been taken.44
The Court stated that in accordance with Williamson, the facts
in MacDonald "[1] eave open the possibility that some development
will be permitted. ' 45 For this reason, a determination as to whether
a taking has occurred, or whether the county failed to provide just
compensation, could not be made until the County Planning Com-
mission rendered a final decision regarding the regulatory applica-
tions to the property in question.4 6
3. Further Development
As takings jurisprudence continued to develop, the 1992 Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council47 decision determined whether a
state can claim the need to protect public safety as a defense for a
regulation that denies a property owner all economic value of his
nificant part, upon an analysis of the effect of the Commission's applica-
tion of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations had on the
value of respondent's property and investment-backed profit expecta-
tions. That effect cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to
how the regulations will be applied to the respondent's property.
Id. at 199-200.
42. 477 U.S. 340, 340-44 (1986)(holding that ripeness of claim had to be
demonstrated by adequate evidence).
43. See id. at 342 (holding that submitting one rejected development proposal
does not support classification of final decision).
44. See id. (deciding that final decision cannot occur without rejection of nu-
merous proposals on record).
45. Id. at 351-52. For further discussion of what establishes a takings claim as
ripe, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
46. See id. (reiterating exact holding of Williamson). Both the Williamson and
MacDonald decisions emphasize that a taking analysis is inappropriate until a plan-
ning commission's decision is unambiguously conclusive:
Absent a final and authoritative determination by the County Planning
Commission as to how it will apply the regulations at issue to the property
in question, this Court cannot determine whether a "taking" has occurred
or whether the county failed to provide 'just compensation" without
knowing the nature and extent of permitted development, this Court can-
not adjudicate the constitutionality of the regulations that purport to
limit it.
Id. at 340; see also Williamson, 473 U.S. at 198-200.
47. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
2372000]
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investment. 48 The Lucas Court held that when the state imple-
ments a regulation that dispossesses property of an economically
beneficial use, the regulation is a taking, regardless of whether it
was enacted to provide a public benefit or to restrain a harmful
application. 49 The material factor in determining whether a regula-
tion constitutes a taking is not the motivation for the regulation,
but whether it abates a part of the "bundle of rights" that the pur-
chaser receives with the land.50
48. See id.; see also Weinberg, supra note 3, at 330 (stating that in Lucas, chal-
lenged statute prohibited construction of any permanent structure on South Caro-
lina's beachfront areas due to problems of coastal flooding and dune erosion).
Lucas had purchased two beachfront properties just two years before the statute at
issue was enacted. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. Lucas claimed that the regulation de-
prived him of all reasonable investment-backed expectations and thus constituted
a taking, and the trial court agreed. See id. The South Carolina Supreme Court
ruled, however, that even though Lucas lost all economic property value because
of the State's regulation, it was not a taking because the regulation was a valid use
of the state's police power "to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to pub-
lic nuisances." See id. at 1022. As a result of this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
had to determine whether "a valid distinction existed between laws to protect es-
thetic values as in Penn Central or socially desirable public access as in Nollan and
those aimed at curbing 'harmful or noxious uses."' Weinberg, supra note 3, at 331.
49. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 331 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004) (discuss-
ing whether protection of public safety can be state defense for regulatory taking);
see also Henderer, supra note 29, at 410-11 (noting U.S. Supreme Court's decision
to overrule Supreme Court of South Carolina's holding that had denied takings
claim in which state restrictions on coastal development had devalued landowner's
property). In his article, Henderer discussed the varied reactions which the Lucas
decision elicited:
For private property owners, the Lucas decision appeared to represent
some vindication for their contention that the Fifth Amendment pro-
tected their property against such government regulation. Environmen-
talists, on the other hand, feared that Lucas would provide a foundation
for more frequent findings of compensable takings and result in drastic
limitations on natural resource protection.
Id.; see RichardJ. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1411,
1425 (1993) (claiming that Lucas decision probably "reflects the high-water mark
for constitutional protection of private property").
50. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30 (defining ways regulation can also be a tak-
ing); see also Weinberg, supra note 3, at 332 (discussing Lucas decision). Weinberg
agreed with the Lucas Court's economic approach:
Lucas eminently makes sense. An alternative ruling would compel the
courts to engage in hair-splitting distinctions between legislation aimed at
furnishing benefits and laws designed to prevent harms. Further, this
would merely encourage states and localities to employ semantics to shoe-
horn regulations into the latter category .... Where a property owner's
total economic value is obliterated, it matters little whether the state was
fostering a public good or averting public harm.
Id. at 331-32.
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B. The Continued Expansion of the Regulatory Takings
Doctrine in Takings Jurisprudence
1. Cornerstone Decisions
The 1987 decision of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission5'
marked the beginning of the Supreme Court's recent expansion of
the takings doctrine. 52 The Nollans applied for a permit to build a
new home on their beachfront property.53 Their building permit
was granted, but was conditioned upon the requirement that the
Nollans provide public beach access across their private property. 54
In this case, the Supreme Court established the first element of a
two-prong standard, later known as the Nollan/Dolan essential
nexus/rough proportionality test.55 The Nollan prong determines a
regulation's validity by evaluating whether the exaction had an es-
sential nexus to the governmental purpose the restriction was
designed to serve.56 Nollan recognized that " [1] and use regulations
do influence the value of property, but to be constitutional, they
must do so in a manner that substantially furthers a legitimate gov-
51. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
52. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 329. Weinberg discusses recent trends in
modern takings jurisprudence:
Three major Supreme Court decisions in the last twelve years [Nollan,
Lucas, and Dolan] have shown the Supreme Court's zeal to expand the
takings doctrine. While all three decisions reached appropriate results,
language in these opinions might, unless limited by future decisions,
open the takings door wider than the Framers of the Constitution
intended.
Id.
53. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827 (describing California Coastal Commission ac-
tions which were held to constitute taking of Nollans' property).
54. See id. at 834 (conditioning permit on Nollans' grant of public easement).
The Nollans owned a beachfront property, and wished to replace the existing cot-
tage with a three-bedroom house. See id. at 825.
55. See generally Shawn M. Willson, Exacting Public Beach Access: The Viability of
Permit Conditions and Florida's State Beach Access After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 12 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 303 (1997) (discussing Nollan decision).
56. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning
Agency, 34 F. Supp.2d 1226, 1239 (D. Nev. 1999) (discussing Nollan/Dolan stan-
dard as applied to takings). The Tahoe Sierra decision relied upon, and further
clarified the application of the Nollan/Dolan test in regulatory takings cases:
The Supreme Court has developed a test to make this determination in
its "unconstitutional exactions" cases, Dolan v. City of Tigard and Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission the "essential nexus" / "rough proportional-
ity" test. That is, first it must be determined "whether the 'essential nexus'
exists between the 'legitimate state interest' and the permit condition ex-
acted by the city," and then whether some "rough proportionality" exists
between the condition enacted and the "impact of the proposed
development."
Id. (citations omitted).
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ernment interest. '57 Then, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,58 the Court
established the second prong of this test when it held that the nec-
essary connection required by the Fifth Amendment between a gov-
ernment's justifications and the conditions imposed must be
"roughly proportional." 59 While no specific calculation is required,
the regulation must be related both in nature and extent to the
proposed development's impact.60 This test was applied to many
subsequent takings decisions where courts faced the difficult task of
evaluating the weight of the government's interest in relation to the
importance of property owners' ability to utilize their land. 61
Fundamentally, Lucas, Nollan and Dolan involved balancing the
authority of state and local governments to engage in land use plan-
ning against the property rights of individuals. The critical ques-
tion regarding landowners' rights is whether the individual is to
receive just compensation. 62 Like Nollan, Dolan also involved a
physical invasion.63 In order for the storeowner in Dolan to obtain a
permit to expand, she had to dedicate a portion of her property for
a bicycle and pedestrian path to help with flood drainage and traf-
fic problems. 64 As in Nollan, the Court held that if the city wanted
to exact an easement, it would have to compensate the store-
owner.65 By allocating a portion of her property to the public, the
57. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834; see also Henderer, supra note 29, at 417-18 (dis-
cussing final component of takings analysis-whether government has enacted
regulation for proper, legitimate purposes, or as pretext to take private property).
Quoting Justice Scalia, Henderer discussed the nexus that must exist between a
state interest and the means the state employs in order to carry out that interest:
'Justice Scalia noted in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission that a land use
restriction must 'substantially advance' the legitimate state interest behind a piece
of legislation. If the condition restricts the use of property but does not advance
such interest, then compensable taking may be found." Id.
58. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
59. See id. at 375 (establishing second element of Nollan/Dolan essential
nexus/rough proportionality test). Dolan held that the importance of the govern-
ment's interests must be "roughly proportional" to the impact of the imposed reg-
ulation. See id.
60. See id. (explaining degree of nexus required between government regula-
tion's impact and significance of its justification).
61. See, e.g., Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 309 (8th Cir. 1996);
Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 70 F. Supp.2d 598, 604 (D.
Md. 1999); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 34 F. Supp.2d 1226, 1238 (D. Nev. 1999).
62. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383-86 (holding land use regulation does not effect
taking if it substantially furthers legitimate state interest and does not deny land-
owner economically viable use of his land).
63. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 375.
64. See id. (describing property exaction).
65. See id. (noting Court's holding that landowners must be compensated for
easements); see also Henderer, supra note 29, at 418 (stating, "Nollan reinforces the
12
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owner loses her ability "to exclude others," which is recognized as
an essential and protected right.6 6 Nollan and Dolan follow the prin-
ciple articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
that a property use restriction will be considered a taking if not
reasonably necessary to accomplish a substantial public purpose.67
For the government to avoid creating compensable takings in sce-
narios similar to Nollan and Dolan, the permit condition and the
governmental rationale must be linked in "rough proportionality,"
and must further a legitimate state interest.68
For takings jurisprudence, 1987 proved to be a notable year for
the Supreme Court,6 9 because, in addition to Nollan, the Court
handed down two other decisions: Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis,70 and First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
idea that the government is not permitted to implement any prohibition or prop-
erty restriction it desires simply to promote the 'health, safety, morals, or general
welfare'").
66. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 332-33. Emphasizing the validly of the ra-
tional basis analysis, Weinberg stated:
Nollan and Dolan are certainly correct if limited to mandated easements
or similar dedications. Though each decision contains broad language as
to the required nexus and rough proportionality, the courts should resist
the temptation to apply those doctrines to conventional land use regula-
tion.... Only in the most extraordinary cases should a land use control
that does not amount to a physical invasion be set aside as not linked to
the government goal, or grossly disproportionate to it. In those unusual
situations the time-honored requirement that a land use regulation must
have a rational basis, that it "substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests," should suffice to overturn controls that lack that basis.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978)
(discussing link between public purpose and land restriction); Dolan, 512 U.S. at
386-97 (recognizing that ability to determine who can and cannot enter property is
essential to landowner); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (holding that public easements on
private property must be compensated).
68. SeeDolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (noting that government action must be propor-
tionally linked to restriction imposed); see also Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d
1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting difficulty in evaluating importance of govern-
mental interest as compared to individual property rights). The Buckles court
noted:
On the "more difficult question" of who decides whether a land use deci-
sion substantially advances a legitimate government interest, in Del Monte
Dunes the Supreme Court noted that "[a]lthough our cases make clear
that this inquiry involves an essential factual component, it no doubt has
a legal aspect as well, and is probably best understood as a mixed ques-
tion of fact and law."
Id. at 1140(citations omitted).
69. See Callies, supra note 2, at 533 (discussing major takings decisions handed
down in 1987); Michael Berger, The Year of the Taking Issue, 1 BYUJ. PUB. L. 261,
261-63 (1987) (discussing regulatory takings cases which appeared before United
States Supreme Court in 1987, and how they changed doctrine and area of law).
70. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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Angeles.71 In Keystone, the Court utilized the Penn Central invest-
ment-backed expectation standard, but it also relied upon the
state's showing of a strong need for safety-based regulation, an ele-
ment that was absent in Penn Central.72
Any uncertainty as to whether or not a regulatory taking is
within the ambit of the Takings Clause was resolved with the
Supreme Court's holding in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles. 73 This decision stated that the Fifth Amend-
ment requires payment of just compensation for regulatory, as well
as physical, takings.74 This is a greater obligation than the state
practice, which simply set aside the invasive regulation without ever
allocating compensation. 75
71. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
72. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470 (holding where government action is not
physical and permanent, multi-factor balancing test is used to determine if com-
pensation is required); see also Penn Central, 438 U.S at 124. Justice Brennan stated
that while no set formula exists, the test used in all the leading cases is whether the
regulation deprived the owner of all reasonable investment-backed expectations.
See id. A mere reduction in land value is not sufficient to pass this test. See id.;
Weinberg, supra note 3, at 334 (discussing what factors establish regulatory
takings).
73. 482 U.S. 304 (1987); see Henderer, supra note 29, at 420-21 (discussing
how Lucas holding established compensation of regulatory takings). Henderer
notes that the First English Court was one of the first courts to award just compensa-
tion for a regulatory taking:
[1]n the landmark case of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angles, the Court decided that a property owner could re-
cover monetary damages for the interim period between the time of gov-
ernment action and the time when a court declares that the government
action is a compensable taking .... This was the first time that the
Supreme Court declared monetary damages to be an appropriate remedy
for a government taking.
Id. (citations omitted).
74. See First English, 482 U.S. at 304 (establishing that Constitution requires
payment of just compensation for government regulatory takings as well as physi-
cal encroachments).
75. See Weinberg, supra note 3, at 315. Weinburg discussed the controversy
that initially surrounded the First English holding:
This decision overruled state court rulings that a successful owner was
only entitled to have the offending regulation set aside. The view that
regulatory takings should be compensable was the subject of intense criti-
cism, but is now accepted as gospel. The critics feared that requiring
states and municipalities to pay for land use controls deemed unconstitu-
tional would inhibit them from adopting such regulations-a fear unwar-
ranted at the time and certainly not borne out by events since.
Id. at 327 (citations omitted); see also Eberle v. Dane County Board of Adjustment,
595 N.W. 2d 730 (Wis. 1999) (demonstrating that twelve years later, courts still rely
on First English as support for compensating governmental regulatory takings).
The Eberle court noted:
Once there has been a taking, it is clear that just compensation is consti-
tutionally required.... The United States Supreme Court indicated its
agreement with these principles in First English, in which the Court stated
14
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The First English Court conceded that its holding, to some ex-
tent, restricted the discretion of planning commissions and munici-
pal agencies. 76 However, it still defended its decision. The First
English court referenced Justice Holmes statement made in Penn-
sylvania Coal, "'a strong public desire to improve the public condi-
tion is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change."' 77
"We merely hold that where the government activities have already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the gov-
ernment can relieve it of its duty to provide compensation for the period
during which the taking was effective."
Id. at 742-43 (citations omitted); see also Karena Anderson, Strategic Litigating in
Land Use Cases: Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 465, 477 (1998)
(discussing compensation options created by First English). Anderson noted that
the First English holding created two compensatory possibilities:
First English does not, however, dictate that every taking will produce
money damages in lieu of injunctive relief; rather the opinion vests that
option in the defendant. A governmental entity can either invalidate the
offending regulation as applied to the plaintiff and pay any interim com-
pensation due, or it can continue the force of the regulation and pay
compensation for a permanent taking.
Id.
76. See First English, 482 U.S. at 321-322 (recognizing resulting reduction in
deference granted to local agencies).
77. Id. at 321-22 (noting that holding may impinge upon agency discretion).
The First English Court stated in its holding:
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some
extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing
bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations.
But such consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a
claim of constitutional right; many of the provisions of the Constitution
are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of government authori-
ties, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of
them.
Id. at 321; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1992) (discuss-
ing constitutional restrictions on government agencies); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp.2d 1226 (D. Nev. 1999)
(explaining further how holding of First English should be applied). The Tahoe-
Sierra court noted:
It has often been stated in regulatory takings cases involving temporary
takings that the government retains a choice once a regulation has been
proven to effect a taking-either to retain the regulation in force and pay
just compensation for the total value of the property, or to repeal the
regulation and only face damages for the temporary period in which the
regulation was enforced. The Supreme Court has been careful not to al-
low property owners to be able to "force" the government to exercise its
power of eminent domain.
Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp.2d at 1247.
After First English, cases such as Tahoe-Sierra demonstrated the courts' recogni-
tion and validation of the notion that takings could occur through regulations as
well as physical invasions. See id.
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C. The Development of 42 U.S.C Section 1983 Claims in Land
Use Cases
In addition to establishing the essential nexus/rough propor-
tionality test, the cornerstone Dolan decision was critical because it
clarified aspects of the judicial process surrounding takings claims.
The Dolan Court explained that takings claims are often brought
under section 1983 as a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and that
the Takings Clause is applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment.78
Section 1983, the federal civil rights statute did not emerge as a
device for asserting constitutional violations in the land use context
until roughly thirty years ago. 79 Prior to 1978, two circumstances
procedurally restricted landowner plaintiffs to direct constitutional
actions for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violation claims
against local agencies.8 0 First, most of the agencies were protected
defendants, immune from suit under the federal civil rights statute;
second, courts had not yet interpreted section 1983 to extend to
landowner interests.8 ' Today, however, more and more litigants
are utilizing section 1983 claims as an effective way to remedy gov-
ernmental regulation rising to the level of a taking.8 2 Specifically,
tort claims brought pursuant to section 1983 grant plaintiffs the
right to seek relief through an "action at law," or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.8 3
78. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 383 (explaining how takings claims are brought and
how they are enforced upon states). For further discussion of section 1983, see
infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 1994). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id.
80. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (hold-
ing that local government agencies are classified as "persons" available to suit
within meaning of section 1983).
81. See Nicholas Rockwell, Constitutional Violations in Zoning: The Emerging Sec-
tion 1983 Damage Remedy, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 168, 178 (1981) (explaining rise of
section 1983 action in takings cases).
82. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 495 (acknowledging that use of section
1983 claims is increasing in takings cases).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710 (explaining
thatjust compensation for governmental taking of property is different from equi-
table restitution and other monetary remedies available in equity because in just
compensation, courts ask what owner has lost instead of what owner has gained).
16
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III. FACTS
The focus in Del Monte Dunes is a 37.6 acre oceanfront prop-
erty, generally referred to as "Del Monte Dunes," located in the city
of Monterey, California. 84 Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. (Del
Monte), the owner and developer of the property, sought approval
from the City to construct a residential community on the
property.8 5
Environmentally, the property had severe damage resulting
from previous owners who utilized the land as a petroleum tank
storage facility.86 A non-native ice plant had been introduced onto
the tract to help prevent erosion and control soil conditions around
the oil tanks,87 This ice plant eventually spread to more than
twenty-five percent of the property and took over the parcel's native
Just compensation is similar to ordinary monetary damages, a compensatory rem-
edy. See id. (stating damages for constitutional violation are legal remedy and mon-
etary relief is classified as legal, not equitable remedy).
84. See Del Monte Dunes at Monterey v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (stating property is at or near city's boundary to north, where
Highway One enters); Del Monte Dunes 526 U.S. at 694 (describing location of
property and surroundings).
85. Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1499 (explaining prior to Del Monte, Ponder-
osa Homes owned property). Ponderosa Homes also sought to build a residential
community on the property. See id. In 1981, Ponderosa Homes applied to the City
for permission to develop the land into 344 residential units. See id. The City
rejected this request, and subsequently, Ponderosa Homes submitted three more
applications for 264, 224, and 190 units, respectively. See id. The City rejected all
three proposals even though they conformed with the City's land use policy and
zoning ordinances. See id. Ponderosa Homes modified its plan for the develop-
ment of 190 residential units and reapplied. See id. While this application was
pending, Del Monte purchased the property and pursued the application. See id.;
see also Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 694 (stating Del Monte was not proposing any
development land was not already zoned for).
Other than the ocean and a state park located to the northeast, the property
was surrounded by a railroad right-of-way and land devoted to industrial, commer-
cial and multi-family residential uses. See id. Under the City's general zoning ordi-
nance, this parcel was zoned for multifamily residential use. See id.
86. See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1499 (describing prior use of property);
see also Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 695 (stating prior owner was industrial corpora-
tion who transported and processed oil). The sewer line was housed in a fifteen-
foot, man-made dune structure that was covered with jute matting and surrounded
by snow fencing. See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1499. Seven tank pads, an indus-
trial complex, a sewer line, accumulated trash, pieces of pipe, broken concrete,
and oil-soaked sand were left behind on the property by the petroleum company.
See id.
87. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 695 (stating ice plant secretes substance
that forces out other plants and is not compatible with property's native
vegetation).
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fauna, thus attaching a serious environmental concern to any fu-
ture site plans.88
Del Monte's proposed development application process
spanned five years, five formal decisions, and nineteen different site
plans.8 9 Zoning on the property allowed for up to twenty-nine
housing units per acre, or more than 1,000 units for the entire
property.90 The landowner's initial proposal, however, was for only
344 residential units.91 In 1982, this plan was rejected by the Mon-
terey Planning Commission. 92 As a requirement of the application
process, Del Monte was prohibited from developing the property
until the Planning Commission approved a tentative map.93 Once
this map was approved, Del Monte could implement a final map
and begin building.94
88. See id. (explaining state that property was in at time of initial ownership).
The ice plant was growing out of control throughout most of the property, overtak-
ing much of the natural fauna. See id. Left untouched, the ice plant would con-
tinue to spread, encroaching on and possibly eliminating the parcel's remaining
natural fauna, including the buckwheat plant, which is natural habitat of endan-
gered Smith's Blue Butterfly. See id. The Smith's Blue Butterfly lives for one week,
travels a maximum of 200 feet, and in order to survive, must land on a mature,
flowering Buckwheat plant. See id. During the landowner's development applica-
tion process, wildlife experts conducted butterfly searches on the property from
1981-1985. See id. No butterflies were ever discovered, except for a single larva
encountered in 1984. See id. That larva was the only specimen ever found, and the
property is significantly isolated from other possible butterfly habitats. See id.
89. See id. at 695 (noting that original 1981 application to develop property
was within City's zoning and general planning requirements).
90. See id. at 696-97 (discussing City's documented zoning requirements for
property).
91. See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1502 (noting Planning Commission re-
quested from developers that environmental impact report be prepared to assess
potential affects on environment). By January of 1982, the environmental impact
report for the 344-unit plan was completed. See id. (explaining environmental im-
pact report process).
92. See id. at 1499 (discussing rejection of preliminary development plans); see
also Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 695 (describing Del Monte's adjustment of first
development proposal). The Commission informed the developers that a 264
unit, or a 7 units per acre plan, would be permitted. See id. at 696. The landown-
ers reapplied, submitting a proposal for the suggested 264 unit project. See id.
93. See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1499 (noting, under California law, Del
Monte had to obtain City's authorization of tentative map in order to begin devel-
opment process). See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66410-66499.58 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1990) (explaining specific tentative map regulations as applied to land de-
velopers). A tentative map is a precise drawing detailing the design of a project
and the conditions on and around the proposed development site that must be
met before a final map can be approved, and actual development can begin. See
id. § 66452.1 (noting tentative map allows for careful, detailed project review
before cost or effort goes into construction).
94. See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1500 (stating advisory board, such as local
or regional Planning Commission, initially reviews developer's application and rec-
ommends to City Council whether tentative map should be accepted or rejected).
18
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The developers' modified plan for 264 units was subsequently
denied by the Commission in December of 1983, as was the ensuing
1984 plan for 224 units.95 In March of 1984, the City Council over-
ruled the Planning Commission's decision and remanded the pro-
ject with a request that the Commission consider a development of
190 units on the property.96 The developers once again reduced
the scope of their project to comply with the City's request and sub-
mitted four detailed site plans, each for a total of 190 units for the
entire parcel.97 The Planning Commission denied the revised ap-
plication in July of 1984, and Del Monte appealed to the City Coun-
cil a second time. 98
On September 13, 1984, the City Council again overruled the
Planning Commission and approved Del Monte's plan for the de-
velopment of 190 units.99 Del Monte modified the project to corn-
The local legislative body, such as the City Council, may then follow or reverse the
advisory board, by approving, conditionally approving, or denying the tentative
map. See id.
95. See id. at 1502 (noting that planning commission had re-advised develop-
ers after 264 unit plan was rejected that it would approve plan for 224 units). The
landowner appealed the decision regarding the 224-unit plan to the City Council.
See id. (discussing landowner's hope that City Council would overrule Planning
Commission's decision due to lack ofjustification). For a discussion of the appeals
process of tentative map applications, see supra notes 93-94.
96. See id. at 1502 (noting developers' further reduction of scope of project,
seeking approval).
97. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 695-98 (noting that developers in all four
alternative plans complied with City's modification requests).
98. See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1502 (stating Del Monte had purchased
property from Ponderosa Homes at this point, and was actively pursuing this ap-
peal). For a further discussion of the sale of the property from Ponderosa to Del
Monte, see supra note 85.
99. See id. (noting approved site plan was known as "scheme D" and was one
of four specific site plans). Scheme D detailed the size and shape of the buildings,
roads, and open spaces. See id. The City Council overruled the Planning Commis-
sion's decision, and approved Scheme D dated August 30, 1984, subject to specific
conditions. See id. at 1503. These conditions included approval of Smith's Blue
Butterfly habitat, protection of rare plants, approval of access, fencing, and grad-
ing underground utilities. See id. The Fire Company, Department of Public
Works, and Home Owner's Association also had to approve the proposed site plan.
See id. There had to be soundproofing between units, and provisions for moder-
ate-income housing. See id. The Council did, however, find that the proposal was
in accordance with several previous council decisions regarding density, number of
units, location on property, and other development aspects. See id. The Council's
approval granted an 18-month conditional use permit for the proposed develop-
ment, and specified certain regulations that required the developers' compliance
as they finalized their building plans. See id. (explaining that without conditional
permit, Del Monte is unauthorized to develop).
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ply with the City Council's requests, and in July of 1985, the
Architectural Review Committee approved its site plan.100
The landowner's final site plan, submitted in 1985, devoted
17.9 acres of the 37.6 acres to public open space. The open space
included areas for the restoration and preservation of the buck-
wheat plant, 7.9 acres to open, landscaped areas, and 6.7 acres to
public and private streets that included public parking and access
to the beach. 1 1 Only 5.1 acres were allocated to buildings and pa-
tios. 10 2 More specifically, the plan provided a public beach access, a
buffer zone between the development and the adjoining state park,
and view corridors so that the building would not be visible to mo-
torists on nearby highways. 103 Additionally, the development plan
included accommodations for the restoration and preservation of
as much of the sand dune structure and buckwheat habitat as was
feasible.10 4
In January of 1986, less than two months before Del Monte's
18-month use permit expired, the Planning Commission, against
the recommendations of the Professional Planning Staff, denied
the tentative map for the proposed 190 unit plan. 10 5 The property
owner immediately appealed to the City Council, which subse-
quently denied Del Monte's final plan and refused to further ex-
tend the conditional use permit. 0 6
100. See id. (discussing Architectural Review Committee's evaluations of Del
Monte's site proposals). In its critique of Del Monte's site plan, the Architectural
Review Committee concentrated on specific details of the proposed residential
units, such as: number of bedrooms in each unit, exterior design, square footage
of each building, size and shape of roadways, and the number, size, and shape of
parking facilities. See id. at 1503-04.
101. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 696-97 (describing acreage allocation in
development plan, including parking, open space beach access, and structures).
102. See id. at 696 (noting that large percentage of property was developed to
benefit public and not for increased profit of developers).
103. See id. at 697 (noting view corridors allowed motorists to have uninhib-
ited sight line to ocean).
104. See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1504 (stating that in August of 1985,
Planning Commission held hearing on Del Monte's tentative map for 190-unit pro-
ject report from Professional Planning Staff, recommending approval of project).
The Professional Planning Staff stated, in its recommendation report, that it ap-
peared as if conditions of approval had been addressed and substantially met by
the applicant's tentative map. See id. The Professional Planning Staff advised the
Planning Commission to find in favor of the developers since they had satisfied all
the City's conditions. See id.
105. See id. (noting this decision prompted Del Monte to appeal because Pro-
fessional Planning Staff had informed Del Monte that it was in compliance).
106. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 697 (noting that Commission declined to
extend permit, thus depriving Del Monte opportunity to address Commission's
concerns).
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The Council did not specify any measures the landowner could
take in order to meet the Council's approval.10 7 Moreover, the
Council's decision was not based on any failure by Del Monte to
comply with the specific City requirements.108 Instead, the Council
stated the landowner's plan had not provided adequate beach ac-
cess, would damage the environment, and would disrupt the habitat
of the Smith's Blue Butterfly. 10 9 This decision led Del Monte to
conclude that the City was not going to permit development of the
property under any circumstances.' 10
Del Monte then commenced suit against the City in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California under
42 U.S.C section 1983, alleging that the City Council's denial of its
final development proposal plan was a violation of the Due Process
107. See id. (noting that all residential plumbing work on property would have
been halted until moratorium was lifted). In conjunction with the Council's deci-
sion, a sewer moratorium was issued by another agency, which would have further
restricted, or, at the very least, severely delayed development for Del Monte. See id.
(noting that sewer moratorium was issued by agency independent from Planning
Commission, and was not Commission's order).
108. See id.; see also Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1504. The City Council's
decision ofJune 1986 was set forth in Resolution No. 86-96. See id. This resolution
stated that the site was not physically suitable for this type of development, that the
project would result in significant environmental impacts which have not been
properly mitigated, the site did not provide adequate access or use of public ease-
ment, and that the development would substantially injure the habitat of the en-
dangered Smith's Blue Butterfly. See id. at 1504-06. This resolution directly
contradicted the City Council's September 13, 1984 Resolution No. 84-160, where
the Council made findings that the design of the project was consistent with the
City's general plan for land use, that the site was physically suitable for that type of
development, the proposed subdivision was not likely to cause substantial environ-
mental harm or injure wildlife and their habitats, and that the proposed design
would not conflict with easements for public access. See id. at 1503.
109. See id. at 1504-05. In court, Del Monte contended that the Council's
findings in Resolution No. 86-96 were inconsistent with their findings in Resolu-
tion No. 84-160, and that denial was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. See id.
Del Monte further argued that it spent 20 months working with the City's Profes-
sional Planning Staff in order to comply with the building conditions set forth by
the City, and that the City rejected its tentative plan for reasons that contradicted
their previous findings without an additional factual basis for this new decision. See
id. at 1505. Del Monte also contended that it was nonsensical to find adequate
access and environmental protection in September of 1984, but not find it now,
especially since the landowner had twice changed the specific access plans to com-
ply with the City's demands and had established the public beach, view corridors,
and buffer zone the city requested. See id. Additionally, the plan incorporated the
removal of most of the ice plant, and preserved over half the property for the
buckwheat plant. See id. at 1505-06. Del Monte also asserted that the Council's
underlying intent in denying the application was its plan to regulate the property
as open space or quasi-open space without paying Del Monte the required just
compensation. See id. at 1505. Del Monte argued that the City acted upon regula-
tory pretext or motive. See id.
110. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 698.
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and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as an uncompensated, unconstitutional regulatory taking.111
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that the City's
decision was sufficiently final to render Del Monte's claim ripe.11 2
It also concluded that because the State of California had not pro-
vided a compensatory remedy for temporary regulatory takings
when the City issued its final denial, Del Monte was relieved of any
requirement to seek relief in state court prior to seeking federal
relief. 113
Overcoming the ripeness challenges, Del Monte's takings
claim was submitted to a jury.114 At the close of arguments, the
111. See id. (noting Del Monte brought constitutional as well as tort claim
against City); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the text of section 1983, see supra note
79.
Landowners can bring a section 1983 action against government agencies and
their implementation of land regulation policy, claiming that they have been de-
prived of their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Through the Fourteenth Amendment, landown-
ers can allege violations of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Dolan, 512 U.S. 374. The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o state shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV. The Takings Clause states, "[n]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 698-99 (overruling district court's deci-
sion that Del Monte's case was unripe under Willamson County Reg'l Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). The district court dismissed Del
Monte's claims as unripe on the grounds that Del Monte had not obtained a final
decision regarding a development plan that the City would allow, nor had it
sought just compensation in the state court. See id. at 698.
113. See id. (noting that Planning Commission was definite enough in its plan
rejections that Court could assume Planning Commission would not have permit-
ted any development proposals submitted by Del Monte); see also Del Monte Dunes,
920 F.2d at 1506-07 (discussing whether Commission's conduct was sufficient to
characterize its denial as final decision). In the Court's discussion of whether the
City's decision was final, and whether Del Monte had to first seek state relief, the
Court stated that at the time of the appellant's last application, California law did
not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an
inverse condemnation. See id. at 699. Therefore, their only remedy was through
injunctive relief or mandamus. See id. The Court further noted that, at the time of
the alleged taking, California's compensation procedures were inadequate, and as
a result, the appellant established the ripeness of the compensation element of its
regulatory taking claim. See id.; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that Fifth
Amendment requires states to compensate regulatory takings); Macdonald, Sum-
mer, & Frates v. Yolo Co., 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (holding that Court was concerned
that protracted application process to meet final decision requirement would re-
sult in repetitive and unfair procedures).
114. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 699 (noting City strongly objected to
district court's decision to submit Del Monte's claims to jury). On remand, the
district court submitted Del Monte's taking and equal protection claims to ajury,
but reserved the substantive due process claims for a decision by the court. See id.
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district court instructed the jury that it should find for Del Monte if
it concluded either that Del Monte had been denied all economi-
cally viable use of its property, or that the City's decision to deny
the landowner's 190 unit proposal plan did not substantially ad-
vance a legitimate public purpose. 1 5 The jury delivered a general
verdict for Del Monte on its takings claim.' 1 6 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the decision, stating that the district court did not err in
presenting the regulatory takings claim to the jury. 1 7
115. See id. at 700 (regarding whether Del Monte had been denied all eco-
nomically viable use of its property, jury was given specific instructions). The jury
instructions included:
For the purpose of a taking claim, you will find that the plaintiff has been
denied all economically viable use of its property, if, as the result of the
city's regulatory decision there remains no permissible or beneficial use
for that property. In proving whether the plaintiff has been denied all
economically viable use of its property, it is not enough that the plaintiff
show that after the challenged action by the city the property diminished
in value or that it would suffer a serious economic loss as the result of the
city's actions.
Id. The second jury instruction pertaining to whether the City's decision advanced
a legitimate public purpose was as follows:
Public bodies, such as the city, have the authority to take actions which
substantially advance legitimate public interest[s] and legitimate public
interest[s] can include protecting the environment, preserving open
space agriculture, protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and reg-
ulating the quality of the community by looking at development. So one
of your jobs as jurors is to decide if the city's decision here substantially
advanced any such legitimate public purpose.
Id.
116. See id. at 701 (holding that City had deprived landowner economically
viable use of its property without reasonably related justifications, and thus, effec-
tuated a taking). In addition to the general verdict for Del Monte on its takings
claim, a separate verdict for Del Monte was granted on its equal protection claim,
along with a damages award of $1.45 million. See id. In addition to the jury's
verdict, the district court found for the City on the substantive due process claim,
and further stated that this ruling was not inconsistent with the jury's equal protec-
tion and takings verdicts. See id. The Court later denied the City's motions for a
new trial or judgement as a matter of law. See id.
117. See id. (explaining Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm district court's hold-
ing). The Ninth Circuit also noted that because the verdict on the regulatory tak-
ings claim was sufficient to support the award of damages, it did not have to
address the equal protection claim. See Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1430. The
Ninth Circuit stated, "[e]ven if the City had a legitimate interest in denying Del
Monte's development application, its action must be 'roughly proportional' to fur-
thering that interest .... That is, the City's denial must be related 'both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development.'" Id. (quoting Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391). The Ninth Circuit was referring to the
rough-proportionality standard of Dolan; the City, however, later argued that this
was an improper application of the Dolan standard. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at
702 (holding that rough-proportionality standard does not apply in this case).
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted the City's pe-
tition for certiorari.' 1 8 The three questions that the Supreme Court
addressed were (1) whether issues of liability were properly submit-
ted to the jury on Del Monte's regulatory takings claim, (2) whether
the Ninth Circuit improperly utilized a standard that allowed the
jury to evaluate the discretion and reasonableness of the City's land-
use decision, and (3) whether the Ninth Circuit erred in determin-
ing that the rough-proportionality standard of Dolan v. City of Tigard
applied to this case.1 19
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Del Monte Dunes, the Supreme Court emphasized that in-
structions were properly submitted to the jury because, despite the
contentions offered by the City, (1) the Ninth Circuit did not err in
discussing the Dolan standard, because the jury was not instructed
to follow or apply it; (2) the jury did not reweigh the reasonable-
ness of general land use policies set forth by local planning commis-
sions; and (3) the jury instructions asked for an assessment of "an
action at law," seeking a legal remedy in tort based on a factual
issue, and therefore, was an entirely proper jury issue. 120
A. Dolan Rough Proportionality Standard
The Court agreed with the City of Monterey that the rough-
proportionality test of Dolan should not be expanded beyond the
specific context of "exactions-land-use decisions conditioning ap-
proval of development on the dedication of property to public
use." 21 The Court held that Dolan should not be applied to cases
such as Del Monte Dunes, where the landowner's challenge is not
based on an excessive exaction, but rather on a denial of his or her
right to develop. 122
118. See id. at 703 (holding that misapplication of this standard does not affect
decision because language was not included in jury instructions).
119. See id. (upholding district court's jury decision). For further discussion
of the Dolan standard, see supra notes 59-68.
120. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 705-11, 716-22.
121. Id. at 702; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (stating that Dolan standard evaluates
whether government-imposed dedications as conditions of development permits
are proportional to anticipated impacts of developer's proposed plan).
122. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 703 (referencing Dolan case); see also
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374 (holding that conditioning of permits by planning agencies
can establish taking). For a discussion of Dolan, see supra notes 59-68 and accom-
panying text.
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Further, the Supreme Court determined, based on two signifi-
cant reasons, that the Ninth Circuit did not make any materially
erroneous holdings. First, the Court pointed out that the jury in-
structions did not include the language of the proportionality stan-
dard, nor did they direct the jury to find for the City if the jury
perceived that the City's actions were "roughly proportional" to the
City's professed interests. 123 Therefore, the Supreme Court stated
that even though the Ninth Circuit discussed the Dolan standard,
the incorporation was unnecessary and irrelevant to the disposition
of this case. 124 Second, the Supreme Court explained that the jury
decision could be upheld on other grounds, irrespective of any
dicta concerning the rough proportionality standard of Dolan.1
25
B. Scope of Jury Review
The City also contended that the Ninth Circuit "adopted a
legal standard for regulatory takings liability that allows juries to
second-guess public land use policy. 1 26 The Supreme Court stated
that it was unreasonable for the City to argue that the jury instruc-
tions did not accurately reflect the law, when the City itself com-
posed the core instructions given to the jury.127 The Court noted
that "[t] his question was couched, moreover, in an instruction that
had been proposed in essence by the city, and as to which the city
made no objection."'128 Regarding the City's claim that municipal
land use policies and regulatory decisions are exempted from judi-
cial review, the Court concluded that the City's assertion was in op-
position to regulatory takings standards.
1 29
123. See Del Monte Dunes 526 U.S. at 703. The Court stated:
The rule applied in Dolan considers whether dedications demanded as
conditions of development are proportional to the development's antici-
pated impacts. It was not designed to address, and is not readily applica-
ble to, the much different questions arising where, as here, the
landowner's challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on a denial
of development.
Id.
124. See id. (mentioning that Dolan standard did not invalidate Ninth Circuit's
decision).
125. See id. (stating that rough-proportionality reference was nonessential to
sustain jury's verdict, taking into account Ninth Circuit's holding that Del Monte
had provided substantial evidence which refuted City's rationale for not accepting
Del Monte's development plan).
126. Id. at 704 (stating City argued jury review undermines agency policy
making).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 706 (explaining, constitutionally, when right to trial is guaranteed).
129. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 706-07 (rejecting City's immunity claims
as erroneous). The Supreme Court stated that "despite the protests of the city and
2532000]
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The Supreme Court acknowledged that there has never been a
"definitive statement" as to specific elements for a temporary regu-
latory takings claim, nor a clear definition as to the applicability of
the "substantially advance legitimate public interests" require-
ment.130 The Court explicitly declined, however, to define these
elements or explain the nature of their applicability in this context.
The Supreme Court did note that the trial court's liability instruc-
tions were in accordance with previous regulatory takings opinions,
and that the City was not challenging the general test for a regula-
tory taking cited by those authorities.131
In support of its argument, the City further claimed that the
Ninth Circuit's judgment was erroneous because it was based upon
ajury decision that assessed the reasonableness of the City's general
zoning laws and land use policies. 13 2 The Supreme Court deter-
mined that this claim was without merit. The Court emphasized
that the jury instructions did not ask for a determination as to
whether the City's zoning scheme was reasonable, but whether the
City's decision to reject Del Monte's 190 unit plan was reasonably
related to, or advanced, a legitimate public purpose. 133 The Court
its amici, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did not adopt a rule of takings law
allowing wholesale interference by judge or jury with municipal land-use policies,
laws, or routine regulatory decisions." Id.
130. See id. at 704 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825(1987)) (stating Court's requirement that regulation must substantially advance
legitimate public interests outside context of required dedications or exactions).
131. See id. (noting Court's references to previous opinions included
landmark cases of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1990); and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)).
132. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 704 (stating that City argued jury deter-
mination of reasonableness of zoning and development plans allows juries to sec-
ond-guess land use policy).
133. See id. at 704-05 (discussing scope of reasonableness inquiry). Moreover,
Del Monte's attorneys were definitive in acknowledging that their contention in
this case is not directed at the right of a City to regulate land. See id. at 705. The
Court quoted Del Monte's lawyers who stated: "'They have the right to set height
limits. They have the right to talk about where they want access. That's not what
this case is about. We all accept that in today's society, cities and counties can tell a
land owner what to do to some reasonable extent with their property."' Id. The
Court also noted that the instructions did not present an opportunity for the jury
to consider the reasonableness of the specific conditions exacted on the property's
development. See id. Additionally, the attorneys for Del Monte did not question
those conditions; in fact, they were quick to point out that these factors were not
the basis of the case either:
'Del Monte Dunes partnership did not file this lawsuit because they were
complaining about giving the public the beach, keeping it [the develop-
ment] out of the view shed, devoting and [giving] to the State all this
habitat area. One third [of the] property is going to be given away for
public use forever. That's not what we filed the lawsuit about.'
26
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noted that in addition to the specific instructions regarding reason-
able legitimate public purposes, the Ninth Circuit further limited
the jury's inquiry by expressly informing it that the City's asserted
public purposes were within the definition of legitimate public in-
terests. 34 The Supreme Court concluded that the question submit-
ted to the jury was sufficiently narrow since the jury was asked to
consider the history and context of the case and to determine
whether the City's denial of Del Monte's plan was reasonably re-
lated to the City's stated justifications.13 5
C. Liability Issues and The Role of The Jury
The City's third inquiry, whether it was proper for the district
court to submit to the jury the question of liability on Del Monte's
regulatory takings claim, began with the Supreme Court investigat-
ing whether Del Monte had a statutory or constitutional right to a
jury trial, and if so, what the nature and extent of that right should
be.13 6
1. Does Section 1983 Itself Confer a Right to a Jury Trial?
The Court reiterated Del Monte's claim that its right to a trial
by jury is supported by section 1983 and the Seventh Amend-
ment.13 7 Reviewing precedent and dictating statutory analysis prior
to reaching the constitutional question, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed possible statutory interpretations of section 1983.138 The
Id. Del Monte's counsel further contended that the City "may ask an owner to give
away a third of the property without getting a dime in compensation for it and
providing parking lots for the public and habitats for the butterfly, and board-
walks." Id.
134. See id. at 706 (noting Court did not give free reign to jury because its
decision was limited to narrow questions with instructions as to which factors
within questions were to be considered).
135. See id. (stating that context of.case was "tortuous and protracted" history
of development attempts).
136. See id. (holding that prior to addressing constitutional issue, Court must
determine if interpretation of statute is feasibly permissible).
137. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 707 (noting that preliminary inquiry into
permissibility of statute's construction is also technique to possibly avoid any con-
stitutional questions).
138. See id. at 707-08 (acknowledging that while section 1983 does grant right
to seek relief through action at law or other proper proceeding, this alone cannot
establish right to jury trial). Del Monte relied upon the statutory language, which
stated that a party can seek relief through "an action at law." See id. at 708. Del
Monte argued that "action at law" is a term of art, which implies a right to a jury
trial. See id. The Supreme Court refused to make this implication. See id. The
Court stated that its finding of a statutory right was in part based upon the lan-
guage of section 1983 that authorized "legal relief," but the finding was also sup-
ported by the statute's specific incorporation of procedures from the Fair Labor
2000]
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Court determined that section 1983 alone does not contain any lan-
guage indicating congressional intent to confer jury rights through
the utilization of the statute.13 9 Once the Court established that it
would be legally impermissible to interpret the statute as indepen-
dently authorizing jury rights, it addressed the constitutional
question. 140
2. Seventh Amendment Analysis
In addressing the constitutional question, the Court began its
analysis by quoting the Seventh Amendment language pertinent to
this issue: "'[in] suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved .... , ,141 The Supreme Court stated that there are two
inquiries relevant to determining whether the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved. 142 First, the Court examined whether this claim
is an "action at law" under the Seventh Amendment, or an analo-
gous claim existing at the time of the Amendment's creation. 143
Second, the Court inquired whether the specific trial decision must
go before a jury in order to uphold common law protected
rights. 144
a. Was this an action at law?
In discussing why it determined that Del Monte's claim was an
"action at law," the Supreme Court began by explaining that the
Seventh Amendment applies to common law claims, as well as to
statutory claims that were unanticipated at common law, provided
that the statutory claims meet two criteria: (1) that they are either
traditional tort claims or an analogous tort action; and (2) that the
Standards Act, which has been interpreted to guarantee trial by jury in private
actions. See id.
139. See id. at 707 (noting Seventh Amendment could not be applied to this
claim but for mechanism of section 1983 action; however, section 1983 action can-
not exclusively establish right to jury trial). Further into its analysis, however, the
Court held that while section 1983 cannot solely confer a right to a jury trial, in
this particular case, a Seventh Amendment analysis incorporates section 1983 and
grants a right to a jury trial. See id. at 708.
140. See id. at 710 (explaining that monetary damages are equivalent to legal
relief and thus constitute action at law). For further discussion of what establishes
an action at law, see infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
142. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 708.
143. See id.
144. See id. (discussing extent that historical analysis influences judicial inter-
pretation of Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury).
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claims seek legal relief.145 The Supreme Court held in Del Monte
Dunes that a section 1983 suit seeking legal relief is an action at law
within the parameters of the Seventh Amendment.1 46 " [W] e have
stated repeatedly that [section] 1983 'creates a species of tort liabil-
ity'. ... Our settled understanding of [section] 1983 and the Sev-
enth Amendment thus compel the conclusion that a suit for legal
relief brought under the statute is an action at law."1 47 The Court
further noted that even though Del Monte sought just compensa-
tion, any damages for a constitutional violation are a legal rem-
edy. 148 Consistent with this reasoning, the Court acknowledged the
general rule that monetary relief is legal relief.1 49 In conclusion,
the Supreme Court determined that because Del Monte's statutory
suit sounded in tort and sought legal relief, it was an action at
law. 150
Next, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that takings
violations are analogous to eminent domain proceedings, where
courts have consistently held there is no constitutional right to a
jury trial.151 The Court conceded that parties bringing condemna-
145. See id. at 709 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1974)).
The Court further stated that "suits at common law" were not limited solely to
claims which the common law recognized and addressed, but also suits in which
legal rights were to be confirmed and decided. See id. The Seventh Amendment
jury guarantee extends to statutory claims unknown at common law as long as
those claims are tortious in nature and seek legal relief. See id.
146. See id. Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, further analyzed the relation-
ship between section 1983 actions and traditional tort claims by noting:
There is no doubt that the cause of action created by [section] 1983 is,
and was always regarded as, a tort claim .... [T]orts are remedies for
invasions of certain rights, such as rights to personal security, personal
liberty and property.... [Section] 1983 assuredly fits that description.
Like other tort causes of action, it is designed to provide compensation
for injuries arising from the violation of legal duties ... and thereby, of
course, to deter future violations.
Id. at 727 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
147. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1986)). Justice Scalia noted past case law,
which recognized section 1983 claims as applicable to the Seventh Amendment.
See id.
148. See id. at 710 (distinguishing just compensation from other equitable
monetary remedies, such as restitution, because in just compensation determina-
tions, material issue is not what government took, but rather what owner lost). See
generally Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910) (stating
that as name implies, just compensation remedy is compensatory, and therefore
historically considered legal relief); see also Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television,
Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 345 (1998).
149. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710-11.
150. See id. at 711 (holding that Del Monte's claim was "action at law" and
eligible for monetary, legal relief).
151. See id. at 711-12 (distinguishing between eminent domain claims, inverse
condemnation claims, and takings actions).
2000] 257
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tion proceedings are not entitled to a jury trial, but distinguished
such an action from a just compensation claim, noting:
Although condemnation proceedings spring from the
same Fifth Amendment right to compensation which, as
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is applicable
here ... a condemnation action differs in important re-
spects from a [section] 1983 action to redress an uncom-
pensated taking. Most important, when the government
initiates condemnation proceedings, it concedes the land-
owner's right to receive just compensation and seeks a
mere determination of the amount of compensation due.
Liability simply is not an issue. As a result, even if con-
demnation proceedings were an appropriate analogy, con-
demnation practice would provide little guidance on the
specific question whether Del Monte Dunes was entitled
to a jury determination of liability. 152
The City further contended that the Constitution allows the
government to take property for public use. 153 The Court recog-
nized that right, but emphasized that the Constitution also attaches
a duty to provide just compensation.154 The government violates
that duty when it denies compensation and does not provide an
avenue through which a remedy can be sought. 155
Once the Court established that Del Monte's section 1983 suit
was an "action at law" within the meaning of the Seventh Amend-
152. Id.; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (stating that Court's determination was sup-
ported by precedent in that right to jury has never been granted to condemnation
action because this type of action does not involve analysis of legal rights since
liability was never in controversy). Unlike condemnation proceedings, a land-
owner in an action for compensation has the burden of challenging the govern-
ment taking, whereas in a condemnation suit, the initiative lies with the
condemning authority. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 712. Moreover, in just com-
pensation cases, the landowner is at a much greater disadvantage. See id. As a
result of this disadvantage, the Court stated that it was unfair and inaccurate to
compare condemnation actions with just compensation suits. See id.
153. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 707 (noting that government's ability to
take land is not in question). The Court stated: "The constitutional injury alleged,
therefore, is not just that property was taken but that it was taken without just
compensation. Had the city paid for the property or had an adequate postdepriva-
tion remedy been available, Del Monte Dunes would have suffered no constitu-
tional injury from the taking alone." Id. at 710.
154. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. For the language of the Takings Clause, see
supra note 19. For the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 20.
155. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 718. The Court additionally stated that
circumstances such as these are not only unlawful, but tortious as well. See id.
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ment, the Court progressed to the second inquiry, whether these
specific liability issues could be properly submitted to a jury.15 6
D. Were Issues of Liability in This "Action at Law" Properly
Before the Jury?
When determining if the particular issues in this context can
be appropriately submitted to a jury, the Court noted that it first
looks to the historical background of takings law, and then, if his-
tory does not provide an unambiguous answer, to precedent and
functional considerations. 157 Finding that history provided no com-
parable common law cases, and that there was little existing prece-
dent addressing liability allocations between judge and jury, the
Court turned to process and function considerations.15 8 Addition-
ally, however, the Court did recognize that questions of liability in
tort generally do go before a jury.15 9
1. Is Determining if There Has Been a Regulatory Taking a
Factual Inquiry?
The notion that primarily factual issues are appropriated to a
jury is incorporated in the Seventh Amendment preservation of the
right to an ultimate jury resolution. 160 In applying this notion to
regulatory takings cases, the Supreme Court reiterated the princi-
156. See id. at 718 (discussing whether Del Monte's claim was required to be
submitted to jury in order to "preserve the right to a jury's resolution of the ulti-
mate dispute").
157. See id. at 720-21.
158. See id. at 721 (discussing general common law procedures regarding lia-
bility decisions byjuries versus judges, and noting that while history does provide
some guidance, it does not provide clear answer or test). In the Court's examina-
tion of current precedent, it faced some difficulty due to the fact that the majority
of regulatory takings cases involve the United States as defendants, and in those
cases, the Seventh Amendment did not apply. See id. In Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Court heard a case
where a landowner sought money damages under section 1983 against a county
planning commission, but since Williamson was not a direct holding, it could not
provide adequate support for the present case. See id. at 1643.
159. See id. at 709 (noting that traditionally questions of tort liability are con-
sidered appropriate for jury review). The Court stated:
It is undisputed that when the Seventh Amendment was adopted there
was no action equivalent to [section] 1983, framed in specific terms for
vindicating constitutional rights. It is settled law, however, that the Sev-
enth Amendment jury guarantee extends to statutory claims unknown to
the common law, so long as the claims can be said to 'soun[d] basically in
tort,' and seek legal relief.
Id. (citations omitted).
160. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721 (noting it was proper to submit fac-
tual questions to jury); see also Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S.
654, 657 (1935) (discussingjury questions and what may be presented).
2000]
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ple of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, which states that the determi-
nation of whether a regulation of property goes too far is evaluated
on the particular facts of each case. 161
Referencing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Court concluded
that determinations of liability in regulatory takings cases were "es-
sentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."' 62 The Lucas Court held that a
regulation "takes" property when the landowner is left with no eco-
nomically beneficial use of the land. 63 This decision was consistent
with the Penn Central Court's holding that while no set formula has
been developed, significant factors to assess include: (1) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, and (2) the character of the gov-
ernment action. 164 The Del Monte Dunes Court relied on these cases
as support for its decision that the issue of whether a landowner has
been deprived of all economically viable use of his property is
mainly a factual one. 165 The Court recognized, however, that
presenting a jury with the question of whether a land-use decision
substantially advanced legitimate public interests within the param-
eters of the regulatory takings doctrine is more ambiguous.' 66 The
Court noted that "[a] lthough our cases make clear that this inquiry
involves an essential factual component .... it no doubt has a legal
aspect as well, and is probably best understood as a mixed question
of fact and law."' 6 7 The Court held instead that the questions
presented to the jury were narrow enough in scope, and sufficiently
161. See id.; see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1987) (dis-
cussing section 1983 claim-related questions).
162. See id. at 720 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1015 (1992)); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S 104, 124
(1978); see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992) (noting these
inquiries require "complex factual assessments of purposes and economic effects
of government actions").
163. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003 (proposing narrow rule that regulation which
removes all productive or economically beneficial use from land is taking, requir-
ing compensation under Fifth Amendment).
164. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (holding that whether specific regula-
tion will require government compensation depends largely upon particular cir-
cumstances of that case). For further discussion of Penn Central, see supra notes 32-
35 and accompanying text.
165. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721 (questioning what constitutes eco-
nomically viable use).
166. See id.
167. Id.; see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 523 (establishing that takings claims are often
questions of law and fact).
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factual in nature, that it was proper to submit Del Monte's issues of
liability to a jury.168
E. Limitation of The Holding
The Supreme Court intentionally limited the conceptual reach
of its holding, stating that it would not attempt to make any bright-
line separation between the respective roles of judge and jury in
determining whether a land use or zoning policy decision substan-
tially advances legitimate governmental interests. 169 The Court, ig-
noring the broader policy questions, stated that a judge/jury issue
demarcation was unnecessary to the posture of this particular case
because when the City approved the submitted jury instructions, it
waived its ability to challenge them.170 The Court then interpreted
Del Monte's section 1983 claim, viewed solely in light of the context
and history of Del Monte's development application process, as
presenting the narrow question of whether the City demonstrated a
reasonable relationship between its decision to reject the develop-
ment plan and that decision's justifications. 171
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Del Monte Dunes, the Supreme Court decided, in a two part
holding, that while section 1983 does not itself confer a right to a
168. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721. For further discussion of the jury
instructions, see supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
169. See id. (stating that holding has no real consequential effects because
Court limited its applicability to specific facts of this case). The Court stated:
The City and its amici suggest that sustaining the judgement here will
undermine the uniformity of the law and eviscerate state and local zoning
authority by subjecting all land-use decisions to plenary, and potentially
inconsistent, jury review. Our decision raises no such specter .... As is
often true in § 1983 actions, the disputed questions were whether the
government had denied a constitutional right in acting outside the
bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages.
These were questions for the jury.
Id. at 722.
170. See id. at 721 (emphasizing limits of its holding). The Court reiterated
that it will not "define with precision" the elements of what constitutes a regulatory
taking, and thus leaves that decision to the jury. See id. Additionally, the Court
stated that because of the City's approval of the jury instructions and Del Monte's
characterization of the issues, it is not necessary for the Court to decide all the
surrounding broader questions, and merely holds that both jury instructions were
valid. See id.
171. See id. at 722 (describing Court's interpretation and limitation of section
1983 questions presented to jury). The Supreme Court established that the ques-
tion of whether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his
property, entitling him to just compensation, is a predominantly factual one and,
therefore, is an action at law within the scope of the Seventh Amendment right to
trial by jury. See id.
2000]
33
Monnig: City of Monterey v. Del Mont Dunes: Did the Supreme Court Needles
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
262 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XI: p. 229
jury trial, a regulatory takings action under section 1983 is an "ac-
tion at law" within the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. 172
Part two of the decision concerned the scope of the specific ques-
tions put before the district courtjury. 173 The Court held that ques-
tions concerning the economic viability of the land and the
reasonableness of the City's justifications for denying development
were narrow enough that submitting them to a jury was not
improper. 174
Although the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1983
is legally correct and in accordance with historical precedent and
legislative intent, the Court did not thoroughly address the secon-
dary policy issues arising from the allowance of section 1983 takings
actions. 175 Part two of the Court's decision is also lacking in com-
prehensiveness and thus further perpetuates the ambiguity already
present in takings jurisprudence. 176 In refusing to expand its hold-
ing, the Del Monte Dunes Court disregarded the opportunity to ad-
172. See id. at 710 (holding that section 1983 action is within Seventh Amend-
ment claim limitations).
173. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 707-11, 716-22.
174. See id. at 720.
175. See George W. Miller, National Resources Development and Takings Litigation,
SD40 ALI-ABA 33, 37 (Jan. 7, 1999) (discussing congressional intent). Miller
states:
"The Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997", 105"h Cong. 1"
Sess., which was passed by the House of Representatives on October 22,
1997, would reverse Hamilton Bank insofar as that case held that a fed-
eral court was without jurisdiction to hear a federal taking claim against a
state entity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where the state's law recognized
an action for inverse condemnation. The legislation was considered by
the Senate on July 13, 1998. The Senate rejected a cloture motion, and
the legislation therefore did not reach the floor. The Clinton administra-
tion had threatened to veto the bill if passed.
Id.; see also Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 712-13 (discussing that early opinions from
time of Bill of Rights interpreted government's taking of property without com-
pensation resulted in action which sounded in tort); Lindsay v. East Bay Street
Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L. 38, 61 (2 Bay 1796) (discussing manner in which suit could
potentially be brought). The Lindsay court stated:
But suppose they could sue, what would be the nature of the action? It
could not be founded on contract, for there was none. It must then be in
tort; it must be an action of trespass, in which the jury would give a repa-
ration in damages. Is this not acknowledging that the act of the legisla-
ture [in authorizing uncompensated takings] is a tortious act?
Id.; see also Gardener v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 164, 166 (N.Y. Ch.
1816) (stating uncompensated governmental interference with property right
would support tort action at law); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S.
546 (1914) (stating as matter of historical practice, when government has taken
property without providing adequate means for obtaining redress, suits to recover
just compensation have been framed as common law torts).
176. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 495 (discussing current confusion in area
of takings law). For further discussion of the current state of takings jurispru-
dence, see infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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dress current discrepancies in takings jurisprudence. It left critical
questions unanswered. Confusion surrounds such issues as the spe-
cific test of what constitutes a regulatory taking, what inquiries are
proper for ajury and what should be limited to ajudge's discretion,
what types of claims can arise, and in what context, and what dam-
ages are available under these claims. 177 This ambiguity has been
the foremost challenge in the area of takings law. There is a severe
lack of clearly delineated standards. 178 This lack of set standards is
especially problematic because land use and development are be-
coming increasingly critical environmental issues. 179 Planning
commissions, lower courts, and developers are looking to the courts
for clear decisions that can be interpreted and applied.' 80
The Supreme Court's holding was too narrow. While it al-
lowed the jury's decision to stand, it limited its holding specifically
to the facts and exact questions presented to thejury.1 81 This deci-
sion unfortunately failed to clarify the pertinent policy questions
surrounding the takings doctrine, and as a result, provided little, if
any, direction to courts and municipalities across the country which
face the same development issues, and are desperately in need of
clear, consistent guidelines.1 82
177. For a further discussion of the problems surrounding current takings
jurisprudence, see infra notes 184-85, and supra note 2 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of the lack of clear standards, see supra note 176 and
accompanying text.
179. See Sierra Club, Sierra Club Stop Sprawl Campaign: Sprawl, Roads, Livable
Communities, and Resources (visited Jan. 9, 2000) <http://www.sierraclub.org/
sprawl/index.asp>. The Sierra Club is of the position that: "[P]oorly planned de-
velopment is threatening our environment, our health, and our quality of life. In
communities across America 'sprawl'-scattered development that increases traf-
fic, saps local resources and destroys open space-is taking a serious toll." Id.
180. For a further discussion of the problems surrounding current takings
case law, see infra notes 184-85, and supra note 2 and accompanying text.
181. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721-22.
182. See Donella H. Meadows, So What Can We Do-Really Do-About Sprawl
(visited Jan. 9, 2000) <http:www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/sprawl/meadows3.asp>
(commenting on need for sprawl management and smart growth solutions).
Meadows contends that our current methods for addressing the problem of sprawl
are inadequate:
We have planning boards. We have zoning regulations. We have urban
growth boundaries and "smart growth" and sprawl conferences. And we
still have sprawl. Between 1970 and 1990 the population of Chicago grew
by four percent; its developed land area grew by 46 percent. Over the
same period Los Angeles swelled 45 percent in population, 300 percent is
settled area.
2000] 263
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A. Interpretation of Section 1983
The Supreme Court detailed a legally sound and meticulously
chronicled description of the analysis it followed to reach its con-
clusion that Del Monte did retain the right to litigate its section
1983 claim in a trial byjury. The Court, however, neglected to eval-
uate how this interpretation might alter the character of regulatory
takings claims. 183 The Court focused its discussion on the proce-
dural aspects of its interpretation without considering the more
substantive ramifications.1 8 4
By allowing landowners to utilize a section 1983 claim as a re-
covery mechanism for a regulatory taking, the Court may be en-
couraging landowners to become more litigious and strategic in the
development of their claims.18 5 Under direct constitutional takings
183. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 709 (stating that Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial includes common law causes of action, but also statutory causes of
action that are parallel to common law claims and can be said to sound in tort and
seek legal relief). Section 1983 claims seeking legal relief are tort actions at law
and within the scope of the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. See id. The
Supreme Court held that because this was a tort action, which sought legal relief, it
was parallel to the types of claims that the Framers of the Constitution intended to
come within the protection of the Seventh Amendment. See id. The Court noted
that to determine whether a particular cause of action is a suit at common law,
within the description of the Seventh Amendment, the Court must examine
whether it was the type of action tried at law in 1791, or if the present claim was
analogous to such a cause. See id. ; see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (discussing what establishes Seventh Amendment claim); Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) (stating that to be action within meaning
of Seventh Amendment, it must seek relief that is legal or equitable in nature).
But see Weinberg, supra note 3, at 323 (agreeing with position of City and its amici).
In contrast, Weinberg argues that takings claims are inappropriate for jury review:
There is no basis in either history or legal principle for jury trials of tak-
ing claims. Under the Seventh Amendment, preserving the right of jury
trial in "[s]uits at common law" in the federal courts, parties are entitled
to ajury if "the right.. .existed under the English common law when the
[a]mendment was adopted" in 1791. This is determined with respect to
the particular cause of action, or if it did not then exist, an "appropriate
analog[y]." At common law, juries never decided whether a taking by em-
inent domain was necessary for a public use, as mandated by the Fifth
Amendment. This was so because condemnation was a special proceed-
ing, not an action at common law. In contrast, the issue ofjust compensa-
tion was, and is, triable by a jury. Since the time a taking, or inverse
condemnation, has existed as a claim, its propriety has been decided by
courts, not juries. No jury was employed in Penn Central, Lucas, Loretto,
Goldblatt, Nollan, Agins, Dolan, Eastern or Phillips. This is because in the
end, takings doctrine is an offshoot of eminent domain-not a determi-
nation of just compensation.
Id.
184. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 707-22.
185. See Poyner & Spruill, Supreme Court Affirms Right to Jury Trial in Takings
Case, 10 N.C. ENVrL. L. LETTER 7 (June 1999, issue 1) (stating, "A recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision has found that ajury can determine damages in a takings
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claims, courts limit recovery to the value of the property interest
taken, whereas a section 1983 claim increases a litigant's potential
recovery.' 8 6 Actions initiated as section 1983 claims require recov-
ery under the tort principle of returning an injured party to the
position it was in prior to injury. 187 Thus, a plaintiff would be enti-
fled to recover attorney's fees, punitive damages, and consequential
damages, in addition to the fair market value of the property
loss.' 88 Landowner plaintiffs may increasingly bring section 1983
claims against local government agencies, believing that a jury de-
termination may prove more favorable and profitable.189 This
case; therefore, landowners with takings claims... may have the ability to obtain
larger monetary awards than typically awarded by judges"); see also American Polit-
ical Network, Property Rights: Supreme Court Hears land Use Case, Greenwire, October
8, 1998, vol. 7 (commenting on consequences of allowing takings claims to go
before juries; "thousands of citizens would be encouraged to sue local govern-
ments over zoning regulations.... It's going to clog the courts and make unbear-
able judicial problems").
186. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 481 (discussing how plaintiffs relief
"[u]nder § 1983 may dramatically differ from that under a direct constitutional
theory"). Anderson further stated that while under a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff
could possibly recover lost profits, lost opportunities, attorney's fees, relocation
costs etc., "[a] direct Fifth Amendment claim would probably not require proof of
actual damages because Takings clause compensates for property value, not for the
landowner's injury ... [t] o require demonstration of actual loss would 'ignore [ ]
the self-executing character of the Fifth Amendment' relied upon by the First Eng-
lish Court." Id.; see also Margaret Tretbar, Calculating Compensation for Temporary
Regulatory Takings, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 201, 238 (1993) (evaluating potential
problems associated with section 1983 takings claims).
187. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 481.
188. See id. at 479-80 (discussing availability of various types of relief under
area of tort law as opposed to more restricted recovery under direct constitutional
claim). Anderson stated:
The availability of a [section] 1983 relief 'levels the playing field' by mak-
ing damages available to litigants suing under either constitutional the-
ory. The statute is modeled on traditional tort law principles and, thus,
opens the door to a broad spectrum of tort-style damages. Most impor-
tantly, these may include consequential damages, punitive damages, and
attorney's fees-presumably none of which are available under a direct
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment suit.
Id.; see also Tretbar, supra note 186, at 238-39 (detailing aspects of section 1983
takings claims).
189. See Douglas Kmiec, Property and Economic Liberty as Civil Rights: The Magis-
terial History of James W Ely, Jr., 52 VAND. L. REv. 737, 743 (discussing Del Monte
Dunes case and section 1983 claims; "[a] landowner frustrated by 'environmental
politics' turns to his fellow citizens on the jury for help"); see also Anderson, supra
note 75, at 483-84 (describing damages possibilities). Anderson, discussing the var-
ious motives plaintiffs have in pursuing their claims, stated:
Some plaintiffs may prefer money, others invalidation. Importantly, the
substantive due process claim holds more promise of offering both forms
of remedy. If a plaintiff wants more than invalidation, she will have to
pursue her substantive due process claim under a statutory mechanism.
Section 1983 offers just that-a viable source of damage recovery. By con-
trast a plaintiff pursuing a takings claim will ostensibly receive some form
2000]
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monetary incentive, however, could be misleading and may further
entangle the already complex recovery process in takings claims.
While not obvious to potential litigants, a plaintiff may actually
have a more difficult time proving injury under a tort action. 190
Under a direct takings claim, a plaintiff is constitutionally man-
dated to receive 'just compensation," whereas under a section 1983
claim, a plaintiff may have to demonstrate actual harm resulting
from the unconstitutional regulation. 191 Actual injury may be a
more rigorous burden, especially in situations where the property
was not in use at the time the questionable regulation was en-
acted. 19 2 This "actual harm" loophole could create a situation
where local agencies carefully plan the implementation of land reg-
ulations around liability potential, rather than as part of a commu-
nity planning scheme.
Section 1983 claims may also have the undesired effect of con-
flicting with state laws and, as a result, further complicate the appli-
cation of takings jurisprudence at the state and local level. 193 As
part of a litigant's case preparation, state tort law and the extent to
of monetary compensation under either a direct constitutional or § 1983
approach but risks no recovery if the governmental entity in question
opts to invalidate the offending regulation. Thus a plaintiff might strate-
gically choose to substitute or supplement a takings claim with a substan-
tive due process or equal protection claim in order to increase the
potential scope of her recovery to include invalidation of the regulation
and a wider array of consequential or punitive damages.
Id. Explaining why just compensation is not always sufficient, Anderson stated:
The built-in remedy of the Takings Clause operates on the legal fiction
that money and property are fungible. Thus, a potential constitutional
violation can be averted by payment of compensation. Imagine, however,
that an aging couple has spent years searching out a parcel of land on
which to build a retirement home-the perfect view, the desired location,
the ideal proximity to grandchildren. If a land use regulation subse-
quently prevented the couple from building this home, compensation in
the form of "fair market value" would not even closely approximate the
couple's loss.
Id.
190. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 482 (discussing that under direct consti-
tutional approach, plaintiff will at least recover fair market value asjust compensa-
tion, but section 1983 plaintiff may theoretically recover nothing until actual injury
from alleged unconstitutional regulation can be established).
191. See id. (noting procedural differences between bringing constitutional
takings claim and section 1983 claim).
192. See id. (stating that actual harm may be arduous to prove in cases where
property was not in use at time that regulations were legislated). "Thus, despite
the broader potential scope of damages under § 1983, actual recovery under the
statutory approach could prove lower than that under the direct constitutional
approach." Id.
193. See id. at 480 (discussing possible discrepancies between state and federal
courts). But see Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721 (arguing decision will have little
effect on relationship between state and federal court systems). The Court stated:
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which it differs from comparable federal standards, especially with
regard to the types of damages that can be recovered, may impact a
plaintiffs decision as to what claims to plead. 94 Where state prac-
tices diverge from those followed in federal courts, there is a poten-
tial for not only confused litigants but, even more detrimental,
inconsistent results among state courts.1 95
B. Del Monte Dunes- Too Narrow a Decision
In its Del Monte Dunes decision, the Supreme Court failed to
recognize the significance of the jury issue beyond the specific fac-
tual parameters of that case.1 96 For district and circuit courts, state
and local agencies, developers and landowners, the jury issue
presented to the Supreme Court was tightly tied to questions re-
garding the appropriate level of deference to be given to a local
decision making entity.197 This case presented the opportunity to
A federal court,.. cannot entertain a takings claim under [section] 1983
unless or until the complaining landowner has been denied an adequate
postdeprivation remedy. Even the State of California, where this suit
arose, now provides a facially adequate procedure for obtaining just com-
pensation for temporary takings such as this one.
Id.
194. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 480. But see Nicholas Rockwell, Constitu-
tional Violations in Zoning: The Emerging § 1983 Damage Remedy, 33 U. FLA. L. REv.
168, 178 (1981) (discussing courts' approach to section 1983 claims). Rockwell
strongly argues for national consistency in damage award policies, stating: "[I]n
order to provide some nationwide uniformity for the redress of important federal
rights, state courts generally incorporate federal policy considerations in determin-
ing damage awards under § 1983." Id.
195. See Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing state versus federal laws in reply brief of appellant claiming different
jury rules in state and federal courts will produce "anomalous results").
196. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721-22 (stating, "[T]he posture of this
case does not present an appropriate opportunity to define with precision the ele-
ments of a temporary regulatory takings claim .... We do not attempt a precise
demarcation of the respective provinces ofjudge and jury in determining whether
a zoning decision substantially advances legitimate governmental interests").
197. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 745 (articulating disappointment over
narrowness of Supreme Court holding); see also Ronald L. Weaver & Nicole S.
Sayfie, 1999 Update on the BertJ Harris Private Property Rights Protection, 73 Mar FLBJ
49 (1999) (discussing unfolding of modern takings jurisprudence). Weaver and
Sayfie make reference to the lack of applicable takings precedent:
Case law contemplating when government regulations so restrict property
use as to constitute compensable takings will continue to evolve, as will
test cases under the act. Landowners who have previously been denied
an effective forum in which to redress their regulatory grievances will
likely weigh these competing paths to possible relief, as takings jurispru-
dence continues to unfold on a case-by-case basis. Current case law seems
to represent a judicial trend to develop a few per se or categorical rights
allowing landowners to recover from affected governments where all eco-
nomic use is lost to government regulations; insulation for governments
where the government demonstrates the proposed use is a "nuisance"
2000]
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address and clarify current takings law, in addition to potentially
establish a platform that the Court could have utilized to establish
doctrinal boundaries providing litigants and lower courts with clear
direction as to when various claims are available, and how to prop-
erly resolve them. 198 The Supreme Court, however, chose not to
dispense any guidance, but instead limited its holding to a very nar-
row application.
VI. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's narrow holding resulted in further con-
fusion and frustration for lower courts looking to the Supreme
Court for some kind of meaningful precedent. 199 Buckles v. King
County200 is a poignant example of the confusion the Del Monte
Dunes decision has caused within the circuit courts. In Buckles, de-
cided shortly after the Supreme Court handed down Del Monte
Dunes, the Ninth Circuit struggled to apply the Supreme Court's
decision. 20 1 The Ninth Circuit noted, "[f] rankly, we have some dif-
ficulty parsing the distinctions laid out by the Supreme Court con-
cerning when a jury trial is required. We find ourselves in
uncharted territory with a map for related, but different waters." 20 2
Similarly, in Eberle v. Dane County Board of Adjustment,203 a devel-
opment permit denial case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin dif-
fered over what constitutes a temporary regulatory taking, in light
under prior law even if a landowner lost all use; and a resistance for
courts to conclude that "government can do no wrong" or that admittedly
laudable purposes can be fulfilled without careful review of the effects on
landowners.
Id.
198. See Anderson, supra note 75, at 469 (discussing what Supreme Court
could accomplish in review of Del Monte Dunes case). Anderson stated: "Perhaps
the Court will articulate doctrinal boundaries between takings and substantive due
process, clarifying the nature of the protection and the corresponding level of
scrutiny that each claim provides." Id. Anderson also discussed the potential im-
pact the Supreme Court could have made with this decision: The Supreme Court's
grant of certiorari "[r]eflects the importance of resolving this confusion and cre-
ates an opportunity to clarify the muddle and provide lower courts with guidance."
Id. at 495.
199. See, e.g., Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 1998) (demon-
strating that Del Monte Dunes decision left lower courts uncertain as to what law is
and how to apply it); Eberle v. Dane County Bd. of Adjustment, 595 N.W.2d 730
(Wis. 1999) (demonstrating further confusion regarding Del Monte Dunes
decision).
200. 191 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 1998).
201. See id. (referencing Del Monte Dunes decision).
202. Id. at 1127 (stating that in light of Del Monte Dunes, Court will consider
whether landowner's takings claim should be tried before jury).
203. 595 N.W.2d 730 (Wis. 1999).
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of the Del Monte Dunes decision.2 0 4 The majority held that a city's
"repeated refusals to approve development plans deprive a land-
owner of all economically viable use of the land" and, therefore, the
court found a temporary regulatory taking, citing Del Monte Dunes
and First English as support.20 5 The dissent, written by the Chief
Justice, argued that Del Monte Dunes is not applicable to the Eberle
case, and that the Supreme Court never established what consti-
tutes a temporary taking.2 0 6 The dissent noted:
This was a [section] 1983 case and most of the discussion
in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion involves the right to
jury trial. First English is cited in the Del Monte opinion
merely for the proposition that when a government con-
demns property for public use, it must provide a forum for
seeking just compensation .... 20 7
The dissent contended that the majority misapplied the discussion
in Del Monte Dunes, as well as the Supreme Court's reliance on First
English.208
This discrepancy within the Eberle court on how to interpret Del
Monte Dunes could have been anticipated. The Del Monte Dunes
Court recognized that the question of what qualifies as a temporary
regulatory taking was a prevalent issue, but chose not to address it
in the opinion.20 9 The Del Monte Dunes Court stated, "l[t] he posture
of the case does not present an appropriate occasion to define with
precision the elements of a temporary regulatory takings
claim. ... 210
The Takings doctrine has historically lacked structure, consis-
tency, and straightforward rules of application, in part due to
courts' reluctance to promulgate judicial limitations and articulate
parameters. 2 11 An expanded holding by the Supreme Court in Del
204. See id. at 732 (discussing whether denial of permit constituted temporary
regulatory taking).
205. See id. at 742 (stating that Del Monte Dunes defines temporary regulatory
taking as repeated permit denials).
206. See id. at 743 (discussing dissent's interpretation of Del Monte Dunes
decision).
207. Id. at 748.
208. See id. at 749 (arguing majority misunderstood Supreme Court's First Eng-
lish reference).
209. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 721-22 (noting limitations of holding).
210. Id. at 721.
211. See Matthew D. Zinn, Ultra Vires Takings, 97 MicH. L. REv. 245, 279-80
(1998) (discussing history of takings doctrine). Zinn stated, "For whatever reason,
takings doctrine is notoriously convoluted and devoid of straightforward rules of
application. As a result, property owners-and arguably governmental agencies
2000] 269
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Monte Dunes may have encouraged a restructuring of takings law.
This restructuring would have aided communities, developers, and
local agencies in their efforts to cooperatively work toward legal,
effective, and environmentally educated planning decisions and
policies. 21 2
The most significant impact of the Supreme Court's Del Monte
Dunes decision may be what the Court chose not to address. The
Court was presented with a myriad of issues, all of which were im-
portant, and unanswered questions within modern takings jurispru-
dence. 213 The Court could have discussed what level of deference a
municipal decision should receive, and when it is appropriate to
submit those decisions to a jury.214 This analysis would have re-
quired the Court to note the benefits of subjecting agencies to jury
accountability, therefore providing communities with a very com-
pelling incentive to develop clear regulatory plans and consistent
permit review procedures. These benefits could have been com-
pared and weighed against the disadvantages of limiting the discre-
tion of a policy-making entity to promulgate decisions in the best
interests of the local community. This balancing determination
would not only have highlighted the current problems with plan-
ning commissions throughout the country, but would have also em-
phasized the importance of their role and their need for an
unencumbered ability to carry it out.
The Court also could have addressed the distinctions between
the various recovery methods now available to landowner plaintiffs.
Little case law exists detailing which recovery claims are appropriate
for certain agency action. Lower courts are not certain as to what
differentiates a regulatory taking, a temporary regulatory taking,
and an action that is not a taking.21 5
For decades, landowners and governmental agencies have de-
bated over the compensation of property owners affected by land-
use regulations. 216 As development issues become increasingly
themselves-cannot clearly understand the extent of their respective rights and
responsibilities under the Clause." Id.
212. For a further discussion of the problems surrounding current takings
case law, see supra notes 2, 175-80 and accompanying text.
213. For a further discussion of the issues the Court failed to answer, see supra
notes 2, 181-95 and accompanying text.
214. For further discussion of the lack of clear standards that currently exist
in takings jurisprudence, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
215. For further discussion of the confusion that exists among the different
types of takings, see supra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
216. See Weaver & Sayfie, supra note 7, at 53 (discussing current and future
state of takings law).
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complicated due to the decline of open space, the upsurge of ur-
ban sprawl, environmental concerns, and more elaborate commu-
nity zoning plans, agencies, developers, and courts will be in dire
need of consistent and directive standards to apply.2 17 As Justice
Cardozo stated, property rights are relative to the changing priori-
ties of a growing society.2 18 It is essential that our judicial system
reflect the values of the society it serves to protect. In its Del Monte
Dunes opinion, the Supreme Court disregarded the need for appli-
cability in its decisions. By doing so, the Court further frustrated an
already inadequately developed area of law.
Danielle Monnig
217. For further discussion of the need for clear standards to apply, see supra
notes 2, 175-80 and accompanying text.
218. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 354 (quoting BENJAMIN N. GARDozo, THE
PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 131 (1928)).
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